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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos . 08-2880 & 08-4479 
(consolidated)
___________
MANJIT SINGH DHOOT,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                                       Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin
(Agency No. A97-646-827)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 23, 2009
Before: McKEE, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 28, 2009 )
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Manjit Singh Dhoot, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of
2the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) orders denying his motions to reopen.  For
the following reasons, we will deny his petition.
Dhoot arrived in the United States in January 2003 and overstayed his tourist visa. 
The Department of Homeland Security issued him a notice to appear in February 2004
charging him with removal.  Dhoot appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”),
conceded removability, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief
under the Convention Against Torture.  The IJ found Dhoot’s asylum claims implausible
and ordered him deported to India.  On December 29, 2005, the BIA dismissed Dhoot’s
appeal and we subsequently denied his petition for review.  Dhoot v. Gonzales, 251 Fed.
Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
On February 22, 2008, Dhoot filed a motion to reopen with the BIA based on
changed country conditions and his marriage to a U.S. citizen.  In support of his motion,
he submitted the 2006 and 2007 State Department Human Rights Reports for India and
two affidavits which claim that police in India are actively looking for him and have
harassed and beaten his father.  Dhoot also submitted a copy of his marriage certificate
and his wife’s permanent resident card.  On May 28, 2008, the BIA denied the motion to
reopen, noting that Dhoot did not show a nexus between changed country conditions and
his asylum claims and that the affidavits did not state why the police were looking for
him.  The BIA also erroneously held that Dhoot failed to provide evidence of his marriage
to a U.S. citizen.  Dhoot filed a timely petition for review in this Court.
3On June 9, 2008, Dhoot filed a motion to reconsider and another motion to reopen
with the BIA.  The BIA granted the motion for reconsideration but again denied the
motion to reopen as untimely.  Specifically, the BIA held that Dhoot’s marriage to a
citizen did not qualify as an exception to the 90-day time limitation governing motions to
reopen.  Dhoot filed a timely petition for review and we consolidated his two petitions.      
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the denial of a motion to
reopen for an abuse of discretion.  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Under this standard, we may reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational,
or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  We will
uphold the BIA’s factual determinations so long as “they are ‘supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” Liu v. Att’y
Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992)). 
Petitioners are generally required to file a motion to reopen with the BIA “no later
than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.”  8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  The deadline does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of
“changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the
previous hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Here, Dhoot did not file the motion to
reopen within the 90-day window; therefore, he must show changed country conditions in
India in order to excuse the untimeliness. 
We agree with the BIA and the Government that Dhoot has failed to show that any
change in country conditions in India is material to his asylum application.  While the
Human Rights Reports detail human rights problems in India, Dhoot failed to show how
those generalized conditions affect his likelihood of future persecution.  See Shardar v.
Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (an asylum applicant must make a showing
of a particularized threat of persecution).  Further, the affidavits Dhoot submitted do not
indicate why police might be interested in him or his father, and thus they do not support
a well-founded fear of future persecution on a statutorily recognized ground.  Finally,
with respect to Dhoot’s adjustment of status claim, the regulations do not provide an
exception to the 90-day time limit on account of the ability to adjust status.  Therefore, the
BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion based on Dhoot’s recent marriage
to a U.S. citizen.         
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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